Between Gods and Giants: Defining Being Through Power

In this stretch of The Sophist, Plato stages a metaphysical confrontation between opposing visions of reality—those who claim that only motion and material things exist (“the giants”), and those who assert that only unchanging, immaterial Forms are real (“the gods”). Through the dialogue between the Stranger and Theaetetus, Plato challenges both extremes, proposing instead that being is defined by power—the capacity to act or be acted upon. From this foundation, the dialogue explores how true existence must include both rest and motion, body and soul, thought and change. Yet just as the participants seem to arrive at a stable definition, the Stranger reminds us that philosophical confidence often masks deeper ignorance. What follows is a dialectical segment that questions not just what is, but how we come to know anything at all.

THE SOPHIST

THEAET. What do you mean?

STR. That which comes into existence always comes into existence as a whole. Therefore no one who does not reckon the whole among things that are can speak of existence or generation as being.

[Note: Plato is suggesting that anything that truly comes into existence must do so as a whole—it is not just fragments or isolated parts, but a unified being. Therefore, to speak meaningfully about existence or generation (how things come to be), one must account for the whole as a real aspect of being. This “whole” can be understood not just structurally but metaphysically—as that which gives coherence, purpose, and intelligibility to parts. In Platonic terms, this may allude to the Form of the Good or even God—the principle that unifies and gives reality to all things. Without reckoning the whole (that is, without acknowledging the presence of unity, order, and purpose), one cannot fully speak of being at all.]

THEAET. That certainly seems to be true.

STR. And moreover, that which is not a whole cannot have any quantity at all; for if it has any quantity, whatever that quantity may be, it must necessarily be of that quantity as a whole.

THEAET. Precisely.

STR. And so countless other problems, each one involving infinite difficulties, will confront him who says that being is, whether it be two or only one.

THEAET. The problems now in sight make that pretty clear; for each leads up to another which brings greater and more grievous wandering in comparison with whatever has previously been said.

STR. Now we have not discussed all those who treat accurately of being and not-being; however, let this suffice. But we must turn our eyes to those whose doctrines are less precise, that we may know from all sources that it is no easier to define the nature of being than that of not-being.

THEAET. Very well, then, we must proceed towards those others also.

STR. And indeed there seems to be a battle like that of the gods and the giants going on among them, because of their disagreement about existence.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Some of them drag down everything from heaven and the invisible to earth, actually grasping rocks and trees with their hands; for they lay their hands on all such things and maintain stoutly that that alone exists which can be touched and handled; for they define existence and body, or matter, as identical, and if anyone says that anything else, which has no body, exists, they despise him utterly, and will not listen to any other theory than their own.

THEAET. Terrible men they are of whom you speak. I myself have met with many of them.

STR. Therefore those who contend against them defend themselves very cautiously with weapons derived from the invisible world above, maintaining forcibly that real existence consists of certain ideas which are only conceived by the mind and have no body. But the bodies of their opponents, and that which is called by them truth, they break up into small fragments in their arguments, calling them, not existence, but a kind of generation combined with motion. There is always, Theaetetus, a tremendous battle being fought about these questions between the two parties.

THEAET. True.

STR. Let us, therefore, get from each party in turn a statement in defence of that which they regard as being.

THEAET. How shall we get it?

STR. It is comparatively easy to get it from those who say that it consists in ideas, for they are peaceful folk; but from those who violently drag down everything into matter, it is more difficult, perhaps even almost impossible, to get it. However, this is the way I think we must deal with them.

THEAET. What way?

STR. Our first duty would be to make them really better, if it were in any way possible; but if this cannot be done, let us pretend that they are better, by assuming that they would be willing to answer more in accordance with the rules of dialectic than they actually are. For the acknowledgement of anything by better men is more valid than if made by worse men. But it is not these men that we care about; we merely seek the truth.

THEAET. Quite right.

STR. Now tell them, assuming that they have become better, to answer you, and do you interpret what they say.

THEAET. I will do so.

STR. Let them tell whether they say there is such a thing as a mortal animal.

THEAET. Of course they do.

STR. And they agree that this is a body with a soul in it, do they not?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Giving to soul a place among things which exist?

THEAET. Yes.

STR. Well then, do they not say that one soul is just and another unjust, one wise and another foolish?

THEAET. Of course.

STR. And do they not say that each soul becomes just by the possession and presence of justice, and the opposite by the possession and presence of the opposite?

THEAET. Yes, they agree to this also.

STR. But surely they will say that that which is capable of becoming present or absent exists.

THEAET. Yes, they say that.

STR. Granting, then, that justice and wisdom and virtue in general and their opposites exist, and also, of course, the soul in which they become present, do they say that any of these is visible and tangible, or that they are all invisible?

THEAET. That none of them is visible, or pretty nearly that.

STR. Now here are some other questions. Do they say they possess any body?

THEAET. They no longer answer the whole of that question in the same way. They say they believe the soul itself has a sort of body, but as to wisdom and the other several qualities about which you ask, they have not the face either to confess that they have no existence or to assert that they are all bodies.

[Note: Plato suggests here that to truly understand or “reckon” the whole—which is necessary for something to come into being—one must also account for the soul and its invisible qualities, such as wisdom and justice. These virtues are not bodily or tangible, yet they participate in being. To deny them is to fail to grasp the full nature of existence.]

STR. It is clear, Theaetetus, that our men have grown better; for the aboriginal sons of the dragon’s teeth [the giants] among them would not shrink from any such utterance; they would maintain that nothing which they cannot squeeze with their hands has any existence at all.

THEAET. That is pretty nearly what they believe.

STR. Then let us question them further; for if they are willing to admit that any existence, no matter how small, is incorporeal, that is enough. They will then have to tell what that is which is inherent in the incorporeal and the corporeal alike, and which they have in mind when they say that both exist. Perhaps they would be at a loss for an answer; and if they are in that condition, consider that they might not accept a suggestion if we offered it, and might not agree that the nature of being is as follows.

[Note: Plato is pressing the question of what common feature defines being in both physical (corporeal) and non-physical (incorporeal) things. He’s searching for a unifying principle that allows both material objects and immaterial realities—like the soul, virtues, or ideas—to be said to “exist.” This leads to his proposal that power—the capacity to affect or be affected—is the shared mark of real existence.]

THEAET. What is it? Speak, and we shall soon know.

STR. I suggest that everything which possesses any power of any kind, either to produce a change in anything of any nature or to be affected even in the least degree by the slightest cause, though it be only on one occasion, has real existence. For I set up as a definition which defines being, that it is nothing else than power.

[Note: Plato defines being here not as substance or visibility, but as power—the capacity to act or be acted upon. This aligns with his broader metaphysics, where reality is not limited to physical matter but includes immaterial processes like learning, reasoning, and the soul’s development. In this view, power echoes the dynamic between the active and passiveprinciples: the active (like the divine spirit or daemon) prompts questioning and reflection, while the passive (the soul) receives, responds, and is transformed. The dialectical process—questioning, learning, and coming into awareness—thus becomes a generative act. To exist in this sense is to participate in this interplay of influence, change, and potential realization.]

THEAET. Well, since they have at the moment nothing better of their own to offer, they accept this.

STR. Good; for perhaps later something else may occur both to them and to us. As between them and us, then, let us assume that this is for the present agreed upon and settled.

THEAET. It is settled.

STR. Then let us go to the others, the friends of ideas; and do you interpret for us their doctrines.

THEAET. I will.

STR. You distinguish in your speech between generation and being, do you not?

[Note: Here, the Stranger is asking Theaetetus whether he can distinguish between generation (coming-to-be or becoming) and being (true existence or what is). This distinction is central to Plato’s metaphysics. Generation refers to things that are constantly changing, emerging, or perishing—like physical objects or sensory appearances. Being, by contrast, refers to stable, intelligible realities—such as the Forms (e.g. justice, beauty, the soul). The Stranger is testing whether Theaetetus can recognize that not everything that appears or changes truly is in the deepest sense. This sets the stage for further examining what truly exists versus what merely becomes.]

THEAET. Yes, we do.

STR. And you say that with the body, by means of perception, we participate in generation, and with the soul, by means of thought, we participate in real being, which last is always unchanged and the same, whereas generation is different at different times.

THEAET. Yes, that is what we say.

STR. But, most excellent men, how shall we define this participation which you attribute to both? Is it not that of which we were just speaking?

THEAET. What is that?

STR. A passive or active condition arising out of some power which is derived from a combination of elements.

[Note: Plato (through the Stranger) is offering a definition of participation as a condition—either passive (being affected) or active (affecting something else)—that arises from a deeper power or capacity. This power itself is not isolated but comes from a combination of elements, suggesting that existence involves relational dynamics. In Plato’s metaphysics, this reflects how both the soul and body engage with reality: through interaction, response, and change. It also echoes the earlier idea that being is defined by the capacity to act or be acted upon. Thus, even perception and thought—bodily and soul-based modes of experience—are grounded in this interplay of active and passive forces.]

[Note: Plato seems to be describing how being is not something static, but something dynamic, born of interaction. A “passive or active condition” only exists when there’s the right mix—like soul and object, mind and reality, or perception and the perceived. These combinations give rise to power, and power is the defining mark of being.]

STR. Possibly, Theaetetus, you do not hear their reply to this, but I hear it, perhaps, because I am used to them.

THEAET. What is it, then, that they say?

STR. They do not concede to us what we said just now to the aboriginal giants about being.

THEAET. What was it?

STR. We set up as a satisfactory sort of definition of being, the presence of the power to act or be acted upon in even the slightest degree.

THEAET. Yes.

STR. It is in reply to this that they say generation participates in the power of acting and of being acted upon, but that neither power is connected with being.

[Note: The materialist “giants” argue that generation—the process of change—does involve power (acting or being acted upon), but they deny that this power is connected to being. In their view, only tangible, bodily things truly exist. So while they admit change and interaction occur, they reject the idea that these dynamic capacities (power) imply real existencebeyond the physical. Plato is challenging this by suggesting that power itself—the ability to affect or be affected—is the true marker of being, not just physical substance.]

THEAET. And is there not something in that?

STR. Yes, something to which we must reply that we still need to learn more clearly from them whether they agree that the soul knows and that being is known.

THEAET. They certainly assent to that.

STR. Well then, do you say that knowing or being known is an active or passive condition, or both? Or that one is passive and the other active? Or that neither has any share at all in either of the two?

THEAET. Clearly they would say that neither has any share in either; for otherwise they would be contradicting themselves.

STR. I understand; this at least is true, that if to know is active, to be known must in turn be passive. Now being, since it is, according to this theory, known by the intelligence, in so far as it is known, is moved, since it is acted upon, which we say cannot be the case with that which is in a state of rest.

THEAET. Right.

STR. But for heaven’s sake, shall we let ourselves easily be persuaded that motion and life and soul and mind are really not present to absolute being, that it neither lives nor thinks, but awful and holy, devoid of mind, is fixed and immovable?

THEAET. That would be a shocking admission to make, Stranger.

STR. But shall we say that it has mind, but not life?

THEAET. How can we?

STR. But do we say that both of these exist in it, and yet go on to say that it does not possess them in a soul?

THEAET. But how else can it possess them?

STR. Then shall we say that it has mind and life and soul, but, although endowed with soul, is absolutely immovable?

THEAET. All those things seem to me absurd.

STR. And it must be conceded that motion and that which is moved exist.

THEAET. Of course.

STR. Then the result is, Theaetetus, that if there is no motion, there is no mind in anyone about anything anywhere.

THEAET. Exactly.

STR. And on the other hand, if we admit that all things are in flux and motion, we shall remove mind itself from the number of existing things by this theory also.

THEAET. How so?

STR. Do you think that sameness of quality or nature or relations could ever come into existence without the state of rest?

THEAET. Not at all.

STR. What then? Without these can you see how mind could exist or come into existence anywhere?

THEAET. By no means.

STR. And yet we certainly must contend by every argument against him who does away with knowledge or reason or mind and then makes any dogmatic assertion about anything.

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. Then the philosopher, who pays the highest honour to these things, must necessarily, as it seems, because of them refuse to accept the theory of those who say the universe is at rest, whether as a unity or in many forms, and must also refuse utterly to listen to those who say that being is universal motion; he must quote the children’s prayer, “all things immovable and in motion,” and must say that being and the universe consist of both.

[Note: Plato, through the Stranger, argues that a true philosopher must reject extreme metaphysical positions—those who claim the universe is entirely at rest (like the Eleatics) and those who claim it is nothing but motion (like Heraclitus or the flux theorists). Both positions, when taken alone, undermine the possibility of knowledge, mind, or stable meaning. Instead, the philosopher must affirm that being includes both rest and motion. This balanced view preserves the conditions for reason, stability, and change to coexist. By quoting the “children’s prayer,” Plato humorously yet profoundly suggests that even simple wisdom recognizes the universe is made of opposites, and that true being must include both the changeless (Forms, intelligibility) and the changing (becoming, perception).]

[Note: This passage completes the metaphorical battle between the “gods” and the “giants.” The “giants” (materialists) claim that only what is in motion and tangible truly exists—reality is constant flux. The “gods” (idealists) argue the opposite: that only unchanging, eternal Forms are real. But the true philosopher, Plato suggests, must rise above this war and reject both extremes. He must recognize that being is not found solely in rest (as the Eleatic gods say) or motion (as the Heraclitean giants claim), but in their union. The children’s prayer—“all things immovable and in motion”—symbolizes this harmony. For Plato, true being, and therefore the soul’s path to truth, requires both the stability of the intelligible (rest) and the dynamism of the sensible world (motion). The philosopher must hold both together—not as enemies, but as necessary halves of the whole.]

THEAET. Very true.

STR. Do we not, then, seem to have attained at last a pretty good definition of being?

THEAET. Certainly.

STR. But dear me, Theaetetus! I think we are now going to discover the difficulty of the inquiry about being.

THEAET. What is this again? What do you mean?

STR. My dear fellow, don’t you see that we are now densely ignorant about it, but think that we are saying something worthwhile?

THEAET. I think so, at any rate, and I do not at all understand what hidden error we have fallen into.

[Note: Plato, through the Stranger, highlights a classic Socratic insight: that we often believe we understand something—here, the nature of being—just when we are most confused. The Stranger gently mocks their confidence, pointing out that despite having agreed on a seemingly solid definition, they may still be “densely ignorant.” Theaetetus’ reply shows honest philosophical humility: he senses they’ve missed something important but can’t yet see what. This moment reveals how true inquiry involves not just building definitions, but exposing hidden assumptions. It’s a turning point—Plato reminds us that genuine wisdom begins with recognizing our own unknowing.]

STR. Then watch more closely and see whether, if we make these admissions, we may not justly be asked the same questions we asked a while ago of those who said the universe was hot and cold.

THEAET. What questions? Remind me.

STR. Certainly; and I will try to do this by questioning you, as we questioned them at the time. I hope we shall at the same time make a little progress.

THEAET. That is right.

STR. Very well, then; you say that motion and rest are most directly opposed to each other, do you not?

THEAET. Of course.