Absolute Measurement and Philosophical Ascent: The Mean in Plato's Statesman and the Divided Line

Plato's concept of the mean in the Statesman represents one of his most sophisticated treatments of measurement and proportion, forming a crucial bridge between his epistemological and political philosophy. In this dialogue, the Stranger distinguishes between two fundamentally different arts of measurement that illuminate broader themes throughout the Platonic corpus.

The first type of measurement involves comparing things to one another—determining what is larger or smaller, more or less in purely relative terms. The second, more philosophically significant type measures against an absolute standard of "due measure" (to metrion) or the fitting mean. This isn't merely finding a mathematical average, but rather grasping the appropriate proportion that enables something to fulfill its proper function or nature.

This concept resonates powerfully with the divided line from Republic VI. Just as the line depicts an ascent from images and shadows toward the Forms themselves, the movement from relative to absolute measurement represents a parallel epistemological progression. The lower sections of the line—imagination and belief—operate primarily through comparative measurement, while the upper sections—mathematical reasoning and dialectical knowledge—approach the kind of absolute measurement the Stranger describes.

The philosopher-statesman who masters the art of due measure mirrors the philosopher who ascends from the cave. Both must transcend merely relative judgments to grasp absolute standards. The statesman's ability to measure against the mean of appropriateness parallels the philosopher's capacity to know the Good itself as the ultimate standard of measurement for all reality.

This connection extends to Plato's understanding of dialectic as the supreme method of philosophical ascent. The dialectical process involves precisely this movement from relative, hypothetical thinking toward unhypothetical first principles—much as proper statesmanship requires moving beyond mere comparison of policies or practices toward absolute principles of justice and good order.

The mean in the Statesman thus functions as both a practical political concept and a metaphysical principle, embodying Plato's conviction that true expertise—whether in philosophy or statecraft—requires access to absolute standards that transcend the merely conventional or comparative.